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Go to: Top | Short-term Outlook | Int-term Outlook | Equity Updates | Indicator Summary | Commodity Updates
Short-term
Outlook (1-5 Days):
Go to: Top | Short-term Outlook | Int-term Outlook | Equity Updates | Indicator Summary | Commodity Updates
Intermediate-term Outlook (1-3 Months):
Summary: The breakout from 9/20 (should it hold) is
confirmation of the bullish studies from late August.
If SPY closes under 111.30, we will move back to Flat.
Detail:
No change.
The 4 Anchors:
1. Sentiment:
Mostly neutral
2. Studies:
Conflicts between bullish studies
in
August and technical sell signals
3. Trend:
Positive above 112ish
4. Support/Resist:
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Commodity Updates
Equity Indicators - Updates and Extremes
Hindenburg Omen
Last month, we took a look at the Hindenburg Omen, an overly
data-mined "market crash" signal. It got a huge amount of
attention at the time, and was looking prophetic for a couple of weeks,
but has since petered out faster than King Jung il's assertion he's not
a
nepotist.
Arguments vary about when (or if) a Hindenburg Omen signal is rendered
moot, but I'd say the market rallying is a pretty good sign that it's
not working. Actually, looking back at the Report from August, the
S&P did decline about in line (or more) than historical averages, at
least during the first few weeks. It's the longer-term that's not
looking as disastrous.
So let's go back to 1965 and look at every Hindenburg Omen, along with
how the S&P 500 performed during the subsequent 30 days. We'll
separate out future performance based on if the market rallied well or
fell hard during that first 30 days, to see if it had an impact
longer-term.
By "rallied well", let's require that the S&P rise by at least +5%
during that first 30 days, and also that the maximum gain is twice the
maximum decline during that time. For "fell hard", we'll require
the opposite - a drop of at least -5%, with a maximum decline at least
twice as large as the maximum gain. 1
Month Later 3
Months
Later 6
Months
Later Max
Gain 6
Mo. Later Max
Loss 6
Mo. Later From the table,
we can see that there were 20 times the S&P fell hard during the first
30 days, versus only 9 times it rallied well. That's right in line
with historical expectations following the Omen. What's
interesting is how the S&P performed over the ensuing six months.
When the market bucked the Omen for the most part and did well during
the first 30 days, then over the next six months it was positive every
time, and the maximum gain averaged twice as large as the maximum loss
during those six-month stretches. When the market
fell hard during the initial 30-day period, then it also showed a
positive six-month return (which isn't too surprising given the market's
long-term trend and tendency to rebound from shorter-term declines).
But the risk/reward wasn't nearly as positive as it was compared to
those times when the market rallied after the Omen. NYSE
Unchanged Issues Barry Ritholz
pointed out a chart
yesterday from Ron Griess showing the percentage of unchanged issues
on the NYSE. As the exchange went to decimal pricing, the number
of unchanged issues dropped dramatically (it takes less to move a stock
$0.01 than it did to move it 1/16 of a point). The conclusion was
that this is likely the cause of the numerous 90% up and down days we've
been seeing lately. Well, yes and
no. This is a
concept we've discussed several times in the past couple of years, and
it's important to remember. We simply cannot rely on breadth
extremes like we were able to a few short years ago. But I don't
think decimalization is the main culprit. Here's why:
The chart shows
the percentage of unchanged issues (the blue line) along with the number
of extreme breadth days, this being defined as any day where more than
80% of stocks closed up or down on the day (the small gray lines at the
top of the chart). The correlation
between the two is -0.14 (on a scale of -1 to +1), meaning that the two
are very modestly inversely correlated. So as the number of
unchanged issues dropped, the number of extreme breadth days increased.
That's what we expect. But there is a
0.22 correlation between those extreme breadth days and the VIX implied
volatility index. Which makes sense, too - as market volatility
increases, so does the number of extreme breadth days. In fact,
this explains more of the move in breadth than decimalization does. Even still, the
cluster of extreme days since 2008 stands out, and neither
decimalization nor volatility can explain it. I know it's cliché
by this point, but I do blame high-frequency trading for these
distortions, and it's the main reason I rely on breadth as an indicator
less than I used to...especially the vaunted 90% days.
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Equity Market Indicators
Notes: In late August, we got a spike in bullish (for the market) indicators near the 30% level, similar to what we saw in late May and late June, and once again we saw almost immediate buying pressure. Unfortunately, we didn't quite reach the kind of extreme we have previously before the market took off. With the rally over the past 2 weeks, bearish indicators have climbed but haven't reached the 30% threshold.
More history:
* New extreme
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Bonds, Commodities and Currencies - Updates and Extremes
Nothing notable for today.
Jason Goepfert Founder, Sundial Capital Research, Inc.
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